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ABSTRACT 
 
A central problem in studying the valuation effects of corporate governance reforms is that 
most reforms affect all firms in a country.  Thus, if share prices move when governance 
reforms are announced, the price changes may reflect the reforms, but could also reflect 
other new information.  We address this identification issue by studying India’s adoption in 
2000 of major governance reforms (Clause 49), a number of which resemble and predate 
Sarbanes Oxley.  Clause 49 requires, among other things, audit committees, a minimum 
number of independent directors, and CEO/CFO certification of financial statements and 
internal controls.  The reforms were sponsored by the Confederation of Indian Industry (an 
organization of large Indian public firms), applied initially to larger firms, and reached 
smaller public firms only after a several-year lag.  The difference in effective dates offers a 
natural experiment:  Large firms are the treatment group for the reforms.  Small firms 
provide a control group for other news affecting India generally.  If investors consider the 
reforms to be valuable (or more valuable for larger firms), large firms' share prices should 
react positively to reform announcements, relative to small firms.  The May 1999 
announcement by Indian securities regulators of plans to adopt what became Clause 49 is 
accompanied by a roughly 4% increase in the price of large firms over a (0,+1) event 
window, relative to smaller public firms; the difference grows to 7% over a (0,+4) window.  
Mid-sized firms had an intermediate reaction. 
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CAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORMS INCREASE FIRMS’ MARKET 
VALUES: EVENT STUDY EVIDENCE FROM INDIA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A substantial literature evaluates the effect of countries' overall corporate governance 
on share prices, stock market size, ownership concentration, and firm behavior.  Much less is 
known about how specific corporate governance reforms affect firm values.  A central 
problem in studying how governance reforms affect firm values is that most reforms apply 
to all public companies in the country that adopts them.  Thus, if share prices move when 
governance reforms are announced, the price changes may reflect the reforms, but could 
also reflect other new information. 
We address this identification issue by studying India’s adoption in 1999 of major 
governance reforms (Clause 49).  Clause 49 requires, among other things, public companies 
to have audit committees, a minimum number of independent directors, and CEO/CFO 
certification of financial statements and internal controls.  Clause 49 is based on a 1998 
proposed Code of Corporate Governance, sponsored by the Confederation of Indian 
Industry (CII, an organization of large Indian public firms).  Important aspects of the CII 
Code were intended to apply only to larger firms.  The actual reforms applied initially to 
larger firms, next to mid-sized firms, and reached smaller public firms only after a several-
year lag.  This sequence offers a natural experiment.  Large firms can be seen as the 
treatment group for the reforms.  Small firms provide a control group for other news 
affecting the Indian economy generally.  The treatment effect is the returns to large firms, 
relative to small firms, when the reforms are announced. 
If investors consider the reforms to be valuable (or more valuable for larger firms), 
large firms' share prices should react positively to the key adoption announcement, relative 
to small firms.  Over a 2-day (0,+1) event window around the May 7, 1999 announcement 
by the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI, India's principal securities regulator) of its 
plans to adopt what became Clause 49, the share prices of large firms, to which the reforms 
were expected to apply, rose by roughly 4%, relative to smaller public firms.  The difference 
between the two groups grows to 7% over a (0,+4) window.  Mid-sized firms, for whom 
application of the reforms was initially unclear (and was later delayed by 2 years), had an 
intermediate reaction to this announcement.  Small firms, who were less likely to be affected 
by the reforms (and for whom application was later delayed by 5 years), also had positive 
returns, but these may have been due to factors other than the reforms.  These results hold 
up under a variety of robustness tests.  Overall, we report evidence consistent with investors 
expecting the Clause 49 reforms to increase the market values of larger Indian public firms. 
We also evaluate firm-level factors that predict cross-sectional variation in firms' 
reactions to the Clause 49 announcement.  Faster growing firms react more positively, as do 
cross-listed firms.  Faster-growing firms are more likely to raise equity capital, and may 
benefit more from the bonding to good governance provided by Clause 49. Cross-listed 
firms may have greater investment by governance-sensitive foreign investors. 
The positive reaction to Clause 49 contrasts with the apparent negative reaction to 
the 2002 adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the U.S.  Some legal scholars have 
argued that SOX is regulatory overkill (e.g., Romano, 2005: Ribstein, 2002, 2003).  Litvak 
(2007a) finds a negative reaction to key adoption events for cross-listed firms (to which SOX 
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applies), relative to a control sample of non-cross-listed firms; this reaction is concentrated 
in firms with good disclosure and countries that likely to have good overall corporate 
governance (India had neither in 1999).1  Yet a number of key elements of Clause 49 are 
similar to SOX, including CEO/CFO certification of financial statements and internal 
controls, board independence rules, and a requirement for audit committees, which must 
include a financial expert (Appendix A compares Clause 49 to SOX).  Our results, consistent 
with Litvak's, suggest that similar reforms can have different effects, depending on the 
institutional environment of the country which adopts them. 
Part II surveys the related literature.  Part III describes the history of the adoption of 
Clause 49.  Part IV describes the sample.  Part V details our hypotheses and methodology.  
Part VI provides results.  Part VII concludes. 
II. RELATED LITERATURE 
A.  Studies of Specific Legal Reforms 
This paper examines whether a package of mostly mandatory governance reforms 
affects firms’ market value in India.  The directly related literature is limited, especially in 
emerging markets.  The "LLSV" series of papers and related literature provides evidence that 
a country's overall legal environment, and level of investor protection, correlate with 
outcomes in securities markets, including equity market size/GDP, number of IPOs, 
ownership concentration, and dividend policy.2  However, this literature does not study 
specific legal reforms and cannot say much about causation, because omitted or general 
country factors (e.g., civil versus common law) could predict both legal environment and 
capital market outcomes.  It thus leaves open the policy question of the desirability of 
particular reforms. 
With regard to specific legal reforms, a few papers examine U.S. legislative actions, 
typically seeking to limit takeovers.  For example, Mitchell and Netter (1989) examine 
whether an aborted effort to restrict takeovers through tax-law changes contributed to the 
1987 stock market crash.  Karpoff and Malatesta (1995) study Pennsylvania's adoption of an 
extremely strong antitakeover law.  Both find negative share price reactions to restrictions on 
takeover activity.  However, these studies are of limited relevance outside the U.S., because 
most firms have controlling owners and hostile takeovers are rare. 
In the U.S., scholars have also examined the adoption of mandatory disclosure rules.  
Oyer, Greenstone and Vissing-Jorgensen (2005) report evidence that the 1964 extension of 
mandatory disclosure requirements to large NASDAQ firms predicts positive returns to 
firms that had not previously voluntarily met the disclosure requirements; Ferrell (2004) 
reports that this extension reduced share price volatility. 
Outside the U.S., Black, Jang and Kim (2006) and Black, Kim, Jang and Park (2006) 
report evidence that 2001 Korean governance reforms, which applied only to large public 
                                                 
1  It is hard to study the reaction of U.S. firms to SOX because it applies to all U.S. firms.  The natural 
experiment exploited by Litvak and by Smith is that SOX applies to some cross-listed firms but not others; this 
is analogous to the approach adopted here. 
2  See, for example, La Porta, Lopes-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2006) and earlier papers by these authors; 
Durnev and Kim (2005); Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004). 
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firms, predict higher market values for these firms compared to smaller public firms.  
Atanasov, Black, Ciccotello and Gyoshev (2007) report that 2002 Bulgarian reforms which 
restrict financial tunneling improve share prices for firms which face high tunneling risk.  
Nenova (2005) reports that Brazilian legal changes to weaken takeout rights on a change of 
control increase the value of control as a fraction of firm value; subsequent restoration of 
these rights reduced the value of control back to its original level. 
Litvak (2007a) studies market reaction to the adoption of SOX, and find a negative 
reaction of cross-listed companies subject to SOX, compared to control group of non-cross 
listed companies and cross-listed companies not subject to SOX, from the same country.  
The reaction is more negative for already high-disclosing firms, and less negative for faster 
growing firms.  Smith (2007) finds similar results.  
Direct studies of the valuation effects of specific governance reforms are scarce for 
two principal reasons.  First, news about legislation often emerges gradually, making it hard 
to identify an event date or a short event period (Bhagat and Romano, 2002, 2002a).  Even if 
a limited event period can be found, governance rules usually apply to all firms in a country, 
which makes it difficult to assess whether the governance reform causes the observed 
returns. 
The empirical challenge is to identify both a treatment group of firms to which the 
law applies, and a control group to which the law does not apply, or applies differentially.  In 
our study, the delayed application of Clause 49 to smaller Indian firms permits us to treat 
large Indian firms are the treatment group for adoption of Clause 49; smaller Indian firms 
provides the necessary control group. 
B.  Other Related Research 
Cross-listing studies.  One related body of research studies the effect of decisions by 
firms in emerging markets to cross-list their shares on major world exchanges.  Cross-listing 
generally predicts an increase in share price.  An important driver of this increase appears to 
be compliance by cross-listed companies with stricter disclosure rules (e.g., Lang, Lins and 
Miller, 2003; Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004; Reese and Weisbach, 2003).  However, more 
regulation is not always better; the apparent bonding premium for U.s. cross-listed firms 
declines with adoption of SOX (Litvak, 2007b). 
Studies of Indian corporate governance.  Several studies examine Indian corporate 
governance in India generally.  World Bank (2005), Sarkar & Sarkar (2000), and Mohanty 
(2003) examine how firm-level governance influences the behavior of institutional investors, 
or vice-versa.   Mohanty (2003) finds that institutional investors own a higher percentage of 
the shares of better-governed firms. 
Bhattacharyya and Rao (2005) examine whether adoption of Clause 49 predicts lower 
volatility and returns for large Indian firms.  They compare a one-year period after adoption 
(starting June 1, 2001) to a similar period before adoption (starting June 1, 1998).  The logic 
is that Clause 49 should improve disclosure and thus reduce information asymmetry and 
thereby reduce share price volatility.  Share prices would increase when risk drops, but 
expected returns would thereafter be lower.  The authors find insignificant results for 
volatility (volatility is lower post-adoption for both large and small firms, by similar 
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amounts), and mixed results for returns (post-adoption returns are lower for the largest 
firms, but positive for a second set of large firms which are also subject to Clause 49.3 
This study is subject to methodological concerns.  First, the authors measure 
volatility and returns relative to a capitalization-weighted market index, which is dominated 
by the firms they study.  They are thus studying, in effect, whether there is a difference in 
volatility or returns between an equal-weighted portfolio of large firms and a capitalization-
weighted portfolio of large firms.  Second, firm size could predict both volatility and returns 
for a number of reasons, of which Clause 49 is only one.  This concern applies to our paper 
as well, we address it below in our robustness checks. 
III. EVENT HISTORY & CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REFORM IN INDIA 
A.  Overview of Indian Corporate Governance 
Our basic research design is an event study of the impact of Clause 49 adoption 
events on large firms’ share prices, relative to the share prices of small firms.  To provide 
context for our choice of event dates, we provide a quick overview of corporate governance 
reform in India (for details, see Goswami, 2003; Chakrabarti, 2005; Khanna, 2007).  Prior to 
the adoption of Clause 49, India was considered a laggard in corporate governance. From 
1947 (independence) through 1991, the Indian government pursued socialist policies.  The 
state nationalized most banks, and became the principal provider of both debt and equity 
capital for private firms.  The performance of the government agencies who provided capital 
to private firms was assessed based on the amount of capital invested rather that return on 
investment.  This created little incentive for managers of private firms to voluntarily adopt 
good governance practices.  At many firms government funds were basically stolen. 
Moreover, private providers of debt and equity capital faced serious obstacles to exercising 
oversight over managers due to long delays in judicial proceedings and the bankruptcy 
process.  Indian corporate governance, which was considered to be comparable to that of 
British firms at independence, deteriorated. 
In 1991 the government faced a fiscal crisis.  It responded by enacting a series of 
reforms including reduction in state-provided financing, bank privatization, and general 
liberalization of the economy.  SEBI -- India's securities market regulator – was formed in 
1992.  By the mid-1990s, the Indian economy was growing steadily, and Indian firms began 
to seek capital to finance expansion into the market spaces created by liberalization and the 
growth of outsourcing. 
The need for capital, amongst other things, led to corporate governance reform.  
The first major step was CII's promulgation in 1998 of a voluntary Corporate Governance 
Code.  CII proposed that the Code's core provisions would apply only to large Indian firms. 
A few major firms voluntarily adopted the CII principles,4 but general opinion was that the 
voluntary approach was probably insufficient to persuade outside investors to invest in 
Indian firms. 
                                                 
3 The authors also study whether firm betas change after adoption of Clause 49.  Their reasons for 
expecting a change in beta are unclear to us. 
4 We examine the returns to these early adopters in Table 7.  
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A year later, SEBI announced the formation of the Kumarmangalam Birla 
Committee (KMBC), which was tasked with proposing corporate governance reforms.  
These reforms became "Clause 49," so named because they were implemented through a 
new Clause 49, which was added to stock exchange listing requirements.  The adoption of 
Clause 49 was viewed as a watershed event in Indian corporate governance. 
B.  Potential Event Dates 
The creation and membership of the KMBC were announced on May 7, 1999.  The 
committee's tentative recommendations were issued on September 30, 1999, only five 
months later -- a stunningly short period for India.  The committee issued its final report on 
Jan. 26, 2000; its proposals were adopted by SEBI almost immediately, and became effective 
for large firms one year later, on March 31, 2001.  The principal elements of Clause 49 are 
summarized in Appendix A.  Firms that do not meet these requirements can be delisted and 
also face financial penalties.5  Implementation of Clause 49 was staggered, with large firms 
(included in "Group A" on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE)) required to comply first, 
followed by medium-sized firms (required to comply a year later, in 2002), and then small 
firms (initially required to comply in 2003, compliance with principal requirements later 
deferred to 2005).  Very small firms were exempted altogether.  Appendix B indicates the 
effective dates for different groups of firms. 
We collect information on potential event dates and confounding events through a 
detailed search of stories in three leading Indian newspapers (Indian Express, Economic Times of 
India, and Asia Pulse), plus the Financial Times, from January 1999 through February 2000, and 
a more general search for news about corporate governance from 1997-2003.  We identify 
six relevant dates:  May 7, 1999 (formation of the KMBC); June 11, 1999 (first news reports 
about KMBC plans); September 30, 1999 (draft KMBC report issued); October 14, 1999 
(SEBI announces that it will promptly adopt the KMBC recommendations), January 26, 
2000 (final KMBC report issued), and Feb. 21, 2000 (SEBI adopts Clause 49).  We exclude 
the last two because they conveyed little new information to the market:  The final KMBC 
report was similar to the draft report, and SEBI adoption was expected.  We consider the 
suitability of the first four dates below.  Table 1 summarizes these dates and the principal 
confounding events. 
May 7, 1999 is the core event date for this study.  It is when the Government 
announced its support for governance reforms to be implemented by SEBI, and SEBI 
announced the formation of the KMBC.6  We found no prior stories discussing SEBI's 
plans, although a May 5, 1999 story reports that CII was lobbying SEBI to undertake 
governance reforms.7  Thus, May 7 is the first date when investors had reason to expect 
corporate governance reform.  There are no news stories on or near May 7, 1999 that 
suggest confounding events. 
                                                 
5 Financial penalties were added in 2004.  In practice, SEBI has relied on voluntary compliance and 
has not yet imposed sanctions on noncomplying firms.  Remarks of SEBI Chairman M. Damodaran, 
International Conference on Corporate Governance:  Role of Corporate Governance in Improving India's 
Investment Climate (Mumbai, India, Nov. 10, 2006). 
6 See Finance Ministry to Chalk Out Code for Corporate Governance, INDIAN EXPRESS, May 7, 1999.  
7 See Abhinada Das, CII to Urge SEBI, BSE to make Corporate Governance Must for Listings, INDIAN 
EXPRESS, May 5, 1999.  
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A key question is whether, at this early date, investors could anticipate the likely 
contents of the reform, and would expect some reforms to apply only -- or perhaps earlier -- 
to large firms.  We believe both inferences are reasonable.  Corporate governance reform 
efforts in India were largely triggered by CII's promulgation of its Corporate Governance 
Code in 1998.  CII then followed up by lobbying SEBI to implement mandatory reforms -- 
presumably consistent with the CII Code.  CII's efforts were known to investors, as the May 
5, 1999 story noted above illustrates.  CII support for the reforms meant that adoption was 
probable.  Much like the Business Roundtable in the U.S., major Indian firms were the 
interest group most likely to oppose governance reform.  Instead, CII initiated the reform 
effort. 
Moreover, investors had reason to expect the KMBC proposals to be similar to the 
CII Code.  The CII Code was a natural starting place for the Committee's efforts for a 
number of reasons.  CII had lobbied for the reforms and its support was important, perhaps 
essential for their adoption; the May 7 stories outline some likely reforms (which are 
consistent with the CII Code), and the committee chair, Mr. Birla, and a number of its 
members were influential members of CII.8   Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that the 
market would have taken the May 7, 1999 announcement by the Government as an 
indication that corporate governance reform was likely to happen, to happen soon given the 
lack of significant opposition, and to be similar to the CII Code. 
The support for reform by Indian industry is rather exceptional.  In most countries, 
industry usually opposes governance reforms.  Reform normally occurs when this opposition 
is trumped by scandals that motivate legislators and regulators to appease public sentiments.  
Examples of this pattern include the adoption of SOX over industry opposition in the U.S. 
following the Enron and WorldCom frauds (Khanna, 2004; Romano, 2005), and adoption of 
Korean reforms in 1999, following the East Asian financial crisis, despite opposition by the 
Federation of Korean Industry (Black, Jang, and Kim, 2006).  CII's support made the initial 
announcement more salient.  Basing the reforms on the CII Code also makes it more likely 
that they would be beneficial, at least for large firms. 
Although the CII Code did not have a phased implementation schedule based on 
firm size, a number of its core provisions applied only to companies with annual turnover of 
at least Rs. 1 billion (about $22 million), and one of the May 7 news stories suggests that CII 
thought that some rules should apply only to larger firms and that smaller firms should have 
more time to comply.  We believe that investors would reasonably expect, at May 7, 1999, 
some difference in rules between large and small firms, or else a phased implementation 
schedule, but might be uncertain about whether or when the rules would apply to mid-sized 
firms. 
The KMBC held its first meeting on June 4, 1999.  The next potential event date is 
June 10-11, 1999.  These are the first dates on which we found news reports about the 
                                                 
8 The KMBC had 19 members.  Several, including Mr. Birla, were explicitly involved in CII (e.g., 
Rajesh Shan, former President of CII), represented CII member firms (some were from firms which had 
adopted the CII Code, e.g., Narayana Murthy of Infosys), or had worked closely with CII (executives of 
professional organizations, such as the Indian Institute of Chartered Accountants and the major stock 
exchanges.  CII has since partnered with these organizations to form the National Foundation for Corporate 
Governance in India.  
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recommendations that the KMBC was expected to make.9  However, June 10-11, 1999 is not 
a reliable event date because of confounding events.  These dates were in the middle of 
sharp market drop, reflecting increased tension between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, 
with peace talks suspended upon the discovery of mutilated Indian corpses.10 These 
confounding events might differentially affect large and small firms. Moreover, if we are 
correct in assessing how investors understood the May stories, there was little new 
information in the June stories.  The details offered in these stories are consistent with the 
CII Code and the May stories. 
The next potential event date is September 30, 1999, when the KMBC released its 
draft recommendations.11 As expected, the recommendations were patterned closely on the 
CII Code.  The rapid issuance of the KMBC draft confirmed to investors that reform was 
on a fast track.  It also included KMBC's proposal for phased implementation, with the 
roughly 200 Group A firms complying by 2001, followed by the mid-sized firms in 2002, 
and small firms in 2003 (later extended to 2005). 
However, this event date is also subject to confounding events. September 30, 1999 
was in the middle of the 3-week voting period for national elections that would determine 
which coalition would govern India for the next five years and how fast economic 
liberalization would progress.12 Uncertainty about the elections, and thus about liberalization, 
could differentially affect large and small firms. Moreover, if we are correct in our 
interpretation of the May 7, 1999 event date, the release of the draft report would have 
confirmed that the reforms were on a fast track, but not significantly changed investors’ 
expectations about their content.  It would have clarified but perhaps not significantly 
changed expectations for differential application to large versus small firms. 
The fourth potential event date is October 14, 1999, when SEBI announced that it 
would promptly adopt the KMBC's recommendations.13  This event date is again subject to 
confounding events.  October 14, 1999 was in the midst of the coup in Pakistan that led to 
General Musharraf taking control of the government.14  Increased uncertainty or tension in 
Indo-Pakistan relations could differentially affect large and small firms.  Moreover, if we are 
                                                 
9 See Vivek Law, SEBI Weighs Plan to Bring FIs Under Takeover Code Ambit, INDIAN EXPRESS, June 11, 
1999; See Vivek Law, SEBI May Make Audit Panels Compulsory for Companies, INDIAN EXPRESS, June 11, 1999; 
Vivek Law, Consolidation of Accounts May Be Made Mandatory, INDIAN EXPRESS, June 10, 1999.  
10 See India – Sensex Sheds 87 points, FINANCIAL TIMES ASIA, June 12, 1999; Sensex Fall, FINANCIAL 
TIMES ASIA, June 9, 1999.  
11 See KMBC Draft Report (Sept. 30, 1999), Institutional Investors not Have Nominees on Boards – SEBI, 
INDIAN EXPRESS, September 30, 1999; A Curate’s Egg, INDIAN EXPRESS, October 4, 1999.  
12 See Mumbai Diary: Poll Result Worries Hit Sentiment, FINANCIAL TIMES, October 2, 1999; India: Share 
Prices Weaken Further, FINANCIAL TIMES, October 2, 1999; Amy Louise Kazmin, Indian Elections in Final Phase, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, October 4, 1999; Stocks – BSE Closes 33 pts Lower, ASIA PULSE, September 30, 1999.  
13 See Girish Chadha, Birla Panel’s Recommendations to be Implemented by Year-End, FINANCIAL EXPRESS, 
October 14, 1999.  
14 See Rally on Indian Stock Market Halted by Pakistan Coup, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, October 13, 1999; 
Partha Pratim Sinha & Deepak Singh Tanwar, Sinhaspeak Shaves 191 Points off Sensex, INDIAN EXPRESS, October 
15, 1999; K. Seshadri, Turmoil Could Continue on Thursday; High Intra-day Opportunities Likely, INDIAN EXPRESS, 
October 15, 1999; Partha Pratim Sinha, Pakistani Coup Shears 25.5 Points off Sensex, INDIAN EXPRESS, October 
13, 1999; K. Seshadri, Vajpayee Government Must Grab Opportunities, INDIAN EXPRESS, October 16, 1999.   
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correct in interpreting the May 7, 1999 and September 30, 1999 announcements, investors 
already expected SEBI to adopt the KMBC proposal, so this announcement may not have 
provided significant new information. 
The fifth potential event date is January 26, 2000, when KMBC released its final 
report.  The final report was virtually identical to the Sept. 30, 1999 draft report; thus, we do 
not believe that its release conveyed significant new information to the market.15  SEBI's 
adoption of Clause 49, on Feb. 21, 2000, should also have been anticipated by investors. 
In the end, a combination of confounding events and uncertainty about how much 
new information was released leave us with only one reliable event date -- the initial Indian 
Government and SEBI announcement on May 7, 1999 of the formation of the KMBC, 
which signaled the likely adoption of corporate governance reforms patterned on the CII 
Code.  In unreported regressions we examine the other potential event dates in 1999 and 
find no consistent pattern, consistent with the most important news being the confounding 
events.  We find no significant investor reactions on the final two dates, in early 2000.  
IV. SAMPLE SELECTION & DESCRIPTION 
India has over 9,000 nominally public firms, but many are public in form only and 
rarely trade.  Our sample consists of firms listed on the BSE (India's oldest and largest stock 
market).  The BSE divides firms into groups, roughly based on size.  The principal groups 
are large (Group A) firms, mid-sized (Group B1) firms, and small (Group B2) firms.  As 
discussed above, at the time of the initial announcement on May 7, 1999, investors had 
reason to expect the reforms to apply to large firms, had reason to expect weaker rules or 
delayed implementation for small firms, and would be unsure about the effect of the reforms 
on mid-sized firms. 
To test this expectation, we need proxies for firm size.  We treat BSE groups A, B1, 
and B2 as proxies for large, mid-sized, and small firms, respectively.  The actual Clause 49 
implementation schedule corresponds fairly closely to these three BSE groups (see Appendix 
B).  We limit our sample to firms that have share price information on the PROWESS 
database (PROWESS is the principal source of financial information for Indian firms, 
analogous to a combination of Compustat and CRSP for U.S. firms), and trade on both 
Thursday May 6 and Friday May 7, 1999 (so that we can measure returns on May 7). 
Sample size varies depending on the event window.  We have a sample of 791 firms 
for our principal (0, +2) event window -- 159 Group A firms (out of 198 listed Group A 
firms); 378 Group B1 firms (out of 724 listed Group B1 firms), and 254 Group B2 firms 
(out of 2,589 listed Group B2 firms).16  We also construct a small-firm share price index, as 
an equal weighted average of the 216 Group B2 firms which trade on at least 30 consecutive 
pairs of days during the one-year period preceding the event period.  Data on share prices, 
categories (Group A, B1, or B2), and control variables comes principally from PROWESS.  
                                                 
15 See Nandita Datta, SEBI Clears Net Trading, Birla Panel Report, INDIAN EXPRESS, January 26, 2000.  
16 Sample size over different event windows is as follows: (i) event day 0 has 952 firms with returns 
(162 Group A, 436 Group B1, and 354 Group B2); (ii) event window (0,+1) has 837 firms with returns (161 
Group A, 393 Group B1, and 283 Group B2); (iii) event window (0,+2) is described in text; (iv) event window 
(0,+3) has 765 firms with returns (159 Group A, 366 Group B1, and 240 Group B2); (v) event window (0,+4) 
has 747 firms with returns (159 Group A firms, 357 Group B1, and 231 Group B2). 
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For 42 firms, PROWESS did not have industry classifications; we classified these firms 
based on information obtained from their websites. 
We use the following control variables in robustness checks; we have data on all 
control variables for 746 firms (156 Group A, 361 Group B1, and 229 Group B2): 
ln(assets):  firm size in crores as of December 1998 (1 crore = 10M Rs., about 
$220,000) 
busgroup:  dummy variable which equals 1 if a firm is a member of a business group  
as of December 1998 (as identified in PROWESS) 
growth:  geometric average sales growth from 1997-2001, winsorized at 1% and 99% 
forown:  foreign ownership as a fraction of shares not held by the largest (generally 
controlling) Indian shareholder or group, excluding shares held by a foreign joint 
venture partner, if any, as of December 1998 
inside:  fractional ownership by the largest inside shareholder 
industry:  We divide the sample firms into 16 broad industry groups (See Table 2, 
Panel C for details) 
Table 2, Panels A and B reports summary statistics for the principal variables we use 
in this study, for the firms with full control variables.  A little more than half of these firms 
belong to a business group (402/791 = 51%); the mean inside ownership is 37%; while the 
mean foreign ownership is only 3% of the shares not held by insiders.  Panel C provides 
industry breakdowns.  Panel D provides correlation coefficients.  As expected, group A 
firms are larger and have higher foreign ownership and lower inside ownership. 
V.  HYPOTHESIS AND METHODOLOGY 
A.   Overall Reaction to Clause 49 
If investors expect adoption of Clause 49 to improve governance and therefore 
improve profitability, increase access to capital, or reduce risk (and thus cost of capital), the 
announcement of proposed reforms, which led to Clause 49, should increase share prices. 
There are two reasons to expect the effect to be stronger for group A firms than 
group B2 firms, with group B1 firms likely to fall in the middle.  The first is investor 
expectation of differential regulation based on firm size -- either different rules will apply to 
large firms (as in the CII Code), or implementation would be delayed for smaller firms (as 
actually happened).  The second is that some governance reforms -- including requirements 
for a minimum proportion of independent directors, and creation of an audit committee -- 
may be appropriate for larger firms, but not cost-justified for smaller firms.  Thus, investors 
might expect large firms to receive greater benefit, as a fraction of share price, than small 
firms, even without expected differences in rules or implementation.  Both explanations are 
possible.  Empirically, we have limited ability to distinguish between them. 
These explanations share a common feature, which is central to our research design:  
They predict a more positive reaction for large firms, compared to small firms, and let us 
treat small firms as a control group in assessing the reactions of large firms to the reform 
announcement.  The reaction of small firms during the event period will reflect a 
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combination of the expected value to them of the governance reforms, and any other events 
that affected overall Indian share prices during this period.   In fact, the share prices of small 
firms rise slightly during the event period, but we cannot assess whether this reflects positive 
reaction to the governance reforms, reaction to other news, or perhaps a strong positive 
reaction to the reforms (other news), which outweighed a negative reaction to other news 
(the reforms). 
The news stories related to adoption of Clause 49 convey a general sense that 
investors saw the reforms as good for India as a whole, and no evidence of significant 
opposition from smaller firms.  This is consistent with investors and firms believing that, 
while smaller firms might need more time to comply or benefit from relaxed rules, the 
reforms would likely have sufficient value to justify their costs, even for smaller firms. 
Our central hypothesis is then: 
H1:  Group A firms exhibit positive returns, compared to small firms, during the event period around May 
7, 1999. 
A likely corollary is that mid-sized (Group B1) firms will have returns intermediate 
between those of large and small firms. 
A second likely corollary is that if we regress event period returns against a 
continuous measure of firm size, we will find a positive coefficient on firm size. 
B.  Regression Methodology 
We use two principal approaches to assess the differential reaction of large, mid-
sized, and small firms to the May 1999 announcement of SEBI's plans to adopt what became 
Clause 49.  The first is a regression approach:  we pool returns to all firms during the event 
period, and regress these returns on group dummies and other variables of interest. 
We use dummy variables (groupA, groupB1, groupB2) to that indicate each firm's 
BSE group as of December 1998.  We compute each firm's raw return on day t as the log 
change in the closing price from day (t-1) to day t: 
,
, , 1ln( ) ln( )i ti t i tr price price −= −  
For small changes in price, the log change equals the fractional change in price. 
We can compute the return on day t only if a firm trades on both day t and day t-1.  
Table 2, Panel B provides information on trading frequency for firms in each group.  Our 
basic sample is 791 firms (159 from Group A, 378 from Group B1, and 254 from Group 
B2) with returns on each day during our principal (0,+2) event window; sample size varies 
slightly for other window periods.  The Group B2 firms with returns during the event 
window will tend to be the larger Group B2 firms.  Investors might expect these firms to 
also benefit from the governance reforms.  If so, this would bias against our finding an 
additional return for large firms during the event period. 
We sum the daily returns to obtain an overall return over a multiday event period: 
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Here Group B2 is the omitted group.  The mean return to these firms will be captured by 
the coefficient α on the constant term.  Xj is a vector of control variables. 
We also compute market-adjusted returns (MARs) for each firm using an equally 
weighted index of small (Group B2) firms as the “market” index.  We call this the B2EW 
(Group B2, equally weighted) Index.  We construct the B2EW Index using the 216 Group 
B2 firms which have returns on at least 30 days during the one-year period preceding the 
event window.  On a typical trading day, we have returns for roughly 80-100 firms in the 
small-firm index; different firms may be included in the index on different trading days.  Let 
nB2, t be the number of B2 firms with returns on day t.  The index return rm, t is: 
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The market-adjusted return for each firm, during a k-day event period from day τ to 
day (τ+k-1) is the sum of daily market-adjusted returns during the event period: 
1
, ,( )
t k
i i t m t
t
MAR r r
τ
τ
= + −
=
= −∑  
Since the index return is a constant for all firms, coefficients and standard errors for 
the variables of interest will be the same whether we use raw returns or MARs; the only 
difference will be in the constant term.17 
The event period is common to all firms in our sample.  This creates the risk, indeed 
the likelihood, that the individual firm returns violate the usual regression assumption that 
each observation is independent of other observations.  One source of dependence is that 
firms in the same industry or the same BSE group could move together.  We therefore use 
industry-group clusters in all regressions.  We return to the problem of cross-sectional 
correlation of returns below. 
C.  Event Study Methodology 
Our second principal methodology is a variant on the event study using daily returns 
(Brown & Warner, 1985).  For each firm, we compute MARs and cumulative abnormal 
                                                 
17  In robustness checks, we obtain similar regression results with cumulative abnormal returns CARs), 
measured relative to the B2EW index.  We report regression results with raw returns or MARs rather than 
CARs because we are unsure of the economic interpretation of the β of a large firm relative to a small-firm 
index.  We also obtain similar results using "jump" returns, in which we compute the return to each firm as the 
compound return over the event window, computed for a k-day event window as [ln(pricei,τ+k-1) - ln(pricei,τ-1)], 
and also use a jump market return. 
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returns (CARs) based on the usual market model, as well as the standard deviation of the 
MARs and CARs using the B2EW Index as the market index.  We use this hand-constructed 
index because standard indices, such as the BSE200 index, are capitalization-weighted, and 
thus are essentially large-firm indices.  Our hope is that the B2EW Index will capture other 
events occurring in India during the event period that affect all firms.18   
We estimate the market model during a roughly one-year estimation period ending 6 
trading days before the event period (May 8, 1998 to April 28, 1999): 
, , ,
*i t i i m t i tr rα β ε= + +  
The cumulative abnormal return over a k-day event period from τ to (τ+k-1) is: 
1
,
k
i i t
t
CAR
τ
τ
ε
+ −
=
= ∑  
To compute a test-statistic for the MARs, we compute a standardized MAR for each firm, 
which is distributed unit normal and forms a z-statistic for the firm's return during the k-day 
event period: 
*
i
i
i
MARSMAR
kσ
=  
Here σi is the standard deviation of the daily market-adjusted returns to firm i during the 
estimation period.  We can then compute a portfolio z-statistic (due to Patell) for the Group 
A firms as: 
1
An
i
i
A
SMAR
z
n
=
=
∑
 
Here nA is the number of group A firms.  And similarly for Group B1 and Group B2 firms.  
We similarly compute a standardized CAR and associated portfolio z-statistic. 
D.  Cross-Sectional Dependence 
Firms within an industry or group (A, B1 or B2) may co-vary with each other.  They 
may also be subject to common influences on price due to economic events during the 
window period other than the governance-reform event we are interested in studying.  Some 
of these common influences will hopefully be captured by the market index and thus will not 
appear in market-adjusted returns.  Industry-group clusters should also control for within-
group or within-industry cross-sectional dependence.  Still if, large firms tend to covary with 
each other (even across industry) more than they covary with small firms, our regression 
standard errors will be biased downward. 
                                                 
18  If we use the BSE200 index as the market index, the Group A firm returns will closely track this 
index.  We would then predict that small firms will have negative MARs or CARs relative to the BSE200 index 
during the event period.  We implement this approach in robustness checks, and obtain the expected results for 
large firms (negligible MARs and CARs) and small firms (significant negative MARs and CARs). 
13
Black and Khanna:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007
…..] Can Corporate Governance Reforms…Evidence from India, Draft 13 
A common response is to compute portfolio returns (Brown & Warner, 1980, 1985).  
This controls for cross sectional dependence but reduces statistical power because the test 
statistic can no longer allow for differences across firms in the variance of daily returns.  
Thus, the portfolio approach can produce false negatives (failure to reject the null 
hypothesis).  We implement the portfolio approach by treating group A firms as a single, 
equally weighted portfolio, and similarly for group B1 and group B2 firms.  We also 
implement a compromise approach in which we group firms into industry-based portfolios, 
and then compute the return to an equal weighted portfolio of the industry portfolios.  This 
allows for cross-sectional dependence within but not across industries.  See Table 8. 
VI. RESULTS & COMMENTARY 
A.  Main Results for Different Event Periods 
Table 3 presents our basic regression results with firm-level raw returns.  It reports 
regressions of firm-level returns over different event windows against groupA and groupB1 
dummies, plus a constant term which captures the return to Group B2 firms. 
Which event window we should use is not clear.  One possibility is advance leakage 
of news.  We find no evidence of leakage.  In unreported regressions, we extend the event 
period to include several trading days before the May 7, 1999 announcement, and obtain 
results similar to those reported below.  We therefore report results for event windows 
beginning on May 7. 
How the proposed governance reforms would affect share values might not be 
immediately obvious to investors.  Thus, it could take several days for the effect of the 
proposed reforms to be fully reflected in share prices.  We are also unable to determine 
whether the May 7 announcement occurred during or after the trading day.  We therefore 
present, in Table 3, results for a variety of event window periods, ranging from the event 
date (day 0) only to a (0, +4) window.  The coefficient on the groupA dummy is significant 
for all window periods, and increases for the longer windows, reaching 7.4% for the (0,+4) 
window. 
The significant positive returns to large firms on day +1 suggest that the (day 0) 
window is too short to fully capture the market reaction to the governance reform 
announcement.  Our best judgment is that a (0,+2) window should be sufficient to give 
investors time to evaluate the reforms, especially because this window includes a weekend.  
In subsequent tables, we standardize on this event window. 
Over the (0,+2) window, Group A firms gain about 4.5% in market value, relative to 
small firms.  This return is both economically and statistically significant.  The returns to 
mid-sized Group B1 firms are always positive, are significant except for the shortest (day 0) 
window, and smaller in magnitude than the returns to Group A firms.  This provides initial 
support for our basic hypothesis. 
There is no evidence of a negative investor reaction for smaller firms. The coefficient 
on the constant term, which captures the return to Group B2 firms, is positive for our 
principal (0,+2) window, although we cannot assess the extent to which this reflects reaction 
to the governance proposal or reaction to other market news.  
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In unreported regressions, we use two alternative size groupings of firms.  The first 
grouping is based on the actual Clause 49 implementation schedule, which was announced in 
September 1999 – after our primary event date.  The second is based on which firms CII 
believed should consider adopting the core provisions of its voluntary Code.  Results are 
slightly stronger than those we report for the first set of groupings, and somewhat weaker 
for the CII-based groupings, but remain positive and significant for larger firms relative to 
smaller ones. 
B.  Treatment of Outlier Observations 
Outlier observations (very high or low returns during the event period) are likely due 
primarily to firm-specific news, rather than the governance announcement.  These 
observations could skew results, affect regression standard errors, or both.  There are a 
variety of options for handling outliers -- including counting them fully, excluding them, 
winsorizing, or running robust regressions.  In Table 4, we show results with several 
alternative approaches.  Results are similar in all cases.  In subsequent tables, we generally 
winsorize at the 5% and 95% levels. 
C.  Alternate Measures of Returns 
As discussed above, regressions with raw returns and market-adjusted returns should 
produce identical results for the groupA and groupB1 dummies.  Table 5 confirms this, and 
also shows that results are similar if we use CARs rather than MARs, relative to the B2EW 
Index (equally weighted index of Group B2 firms).  For MARs, we use two different 
versions of the “market” – one based on the B2EW Index and the other based on the BSE 
200 Index.  Only the constant term changes, as expected.  As mentioned earlier we prefer 
MARs rather than CARs because we are unsure of the economic interpretation of the β of a 
large firm relative to a small-firm index in the CAR regressions.  In the cross-sectional results 
which follow, we use MARs measured relative to the B2EW Index. 
D.  Control Variables 
We next assess whether our results are sensitive to inclusion of various control 
variables and also whether these variables separately predict firms’ reaction to the Clause 49 
announcement.  Below we describe each control variable and our reasons for including 
them.  In Table 6, we add these control variables one at a time to our base regression from 
Table 3 using the (0,+2) event window.  The groupA dummy remains significant and similar 
in magnitude in all regressions.  The groupB1 dummy also remains similar in magnitude, 
smaller than the groupA dummy, and significant in all regressions. 
1.  Firm size. 
Firms could react differently to the governance announcement we study based on 
size -- indeed, our principal hypothesis is that large firms will react differently, either because 
they will be regulated more (or sooner), or because larger firms will benefit more from the 
governance rules.  We use ln(assets) as our measure of firm size. 
In Table 6, regression (2), we include the groupA and groupB1 dummies together 
with ln(assets).  Despite the fairly high (r = .57) correlation between ln(assets) and the 
groupA dummy, the groupA dummy remains positive and highly significant.  This suggests 
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that, even if there is other news during the event window that differentially affects large and 
small firms (which we cannot rule out), investors may be separately concluding that the 
governance reforms will positively affect the value of Group A firms. 
Regression (2) supports our basic hypothesis.  It remains possible that something 
else that is related to size, but unrelated to governance, is producing the observed positive 
returns to Group A firms.  But it would take an odd confluence of events for other news 
(not important enough to be discussed in major Indian newspapers) to predict a positive 
return to larger firms that is not captured by our size control, yet is captured by the Group A 
dummy. 19 
2. Growth Opportunities.   
Rapidly growing firms have greater need for outside capital, and thus may benefit 
more from governance reform than low-growth firms, because governance could enhance 
their access to capital, or reduce its cost.  Our proxy for growth opportunities is geometric 
average annual sales growth over a four-year period around the event date, from 1997-2001. 
This growth measure is computed as: 
1/ 42001 1
1997
salesgrowth
sales
 
= − 
 
 
Table 6, regression (3) adds growth (winsorized at 1% and 99%) as an additional 
control variable.20  The growth measure is positive and significant, suggesting that rapidly 
growing firms benefited more strongly from Clause 49.  (Compare Litvak (2006)'s study of 
the reaction of cross-listed firms to adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley, which also finds a more 
positive reaction for faster growing firms.)  To further study the effect of growth, we ran 
additional regressions in which we interacted growth with the groupA and groupB1 
dummies.  The negative coefficient on the interaction between growth and GroupA dummy 
is consistent with the growth effect coming principally from mid-sized firms.21 
3.  Business group membership. 
Many major Indian firms are members of business groups, known as Business 
Houses.  Prior studies have suggested that being a member of a business group can influence 
performance and governance. Firms in a business group may be more diversified (Ferris, 
Kim & Kitsabunnarat, 2003), have better political connections and access to financing (Shin 
& Park, 1999), be more profitable (Khanna & Palepu, 1999), or more vulnerable to  
tunneling (Bertrand, Mehta & Mullainathan, 2003).  Firms that are members of business 
groups could also react differently -- whether more positively or more negatively is unclear -- 
                                                 
19  In robustness checks, we obtain similar results using ln(sales) and ln(market capitalization as size 
measures.  We also find that in regressions where the only independent variables are ln(assets) and a constant 
term, ln(assets) is positive and significant. 
20  In robustness checks, we obtain similar results using alternative periods for measuring growth and 
different winsorizing levels. 
21  In unreported regressions, the coefficient on an interaction between growth and groupB2 dummy 
is insignificant and negative, confirming that the mid-sized Group B1 firms are driving the positive coefficient 
on growth in regressions (3) and (8). 
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to governance reform.  Table 6, regression (4) adds a busgroup dummy as an additional 
independent variable.  This variable is small and insignificant in all specifications. 
4.  Inside Ownership. 
A number of studies report evidence that the level of inside ownership can influence 
governance and performance (see, for example, Kumar, 2003, 2003a (India); Joh, 2003 
(Korea)).  The level of inside ownership could also affect a firm's reaction to new 
governance rules.  The sign of any effect is unclear.  On one hand, firms with high inside 
ownership may have greater need for outside monitoring.  On the other hand, firms with 
high inside ownership may be less affected by some reforms, such as a minimum number of 
independent directors, because the firm's business strategy will still be determined by the 
controlling shareholder.  We measure inside ownership as: 
 
ownershipby largest shareholder
total shares (excluding shares held by foreign JV partner)inside =  
Table 6, regression (5) adds inside as an additional control variable.  Inside 
ownership is small and insignificant in all specifications.22  
5.  Foreign Ownership. 
Prior research suggests that foreign shareholders may be more likely to invest in 
better governed firms (Sarkar & Sarkar, 1999; Aggrawal, Klapper & Wysocki, 2003; World 
Bank, 2005).  The level of foreign ownership could also affect a firm's reaction to new 
governance rules; for example, foreign institutional shareholders may pay more attention to 
corporate governance than other investors.  Foreign ownership of Indian firms is modest at 
the time of our study.  The mean of foreign-own for all firms in our sample is 0.029. 
We define “foreign-own” as (fraction of total shares held by non-Indian 
shareholders)/(fraction not held by the largest shareholder), excluding shares held by a 
foreign joint venture partner, if any, from both numerator and denominator.  Table 6, 
regression (6) adds foreign-own as an additional control variable.  Foreign ownership is 
insignificant in all specifications.23 
6. Government Ownership. 
The Government controls 33 of the 791 firms in our sample of which 27 are 
controlled by the central government and 6 by state governments.  Of these firms, 25 are 
Group A, 6 are Group B1, and 2 are Group B2 firms. Government ownership can influence 
both performance and governance, and thus could also investor reaction to new governance 
rules.  We therefore define a govt-own dummy variable which equals 1 for government-
                                                 
22  In robustness checks, we obtain similar results if we measure inside ownership as a fraction of all 
shares. 
23  In robustness checks, we obtain similar results if we include shares held by joint venture partners, 
shares held by insiders, or both. 
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controlled firms.   See Table 6, regression (7).  This variable is insignificant in all 
specifications.24 
7. Industry.   
The effects of corporate governance reform can depend on firm characteristics, such 
as industry.  Prior studies suggest that industry can be associated with both governance and 
performance (Black et al, 2006, 2006a; Durnev & Kim, 2005; Gillan, Hartzell & Starks, 2003, 
Rajan & Zingales, 1998).  In unreported regressions with industry dummies, most industries 
have insignificant coefficients.  The exceptions are transportation (positive), construction 
(negative), and agriculture & manufacturing (positive).25 
8. Early Adopters and Cross-Listed Firms. 
Some firms had already adopted a number of Clause 49’s provisions before May 7, 
1999 in response to CII’s voluntary code of corporate governance.  We might expect these 
firms to have a milder reaction to the Clause 49 announcement.  At the same time, reforms 
that improve overall Indian governance might benefit early adopters as well by increasing 
overall investor confidence in the Indian market (compare Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004).  
Goswami (2003) lists 8 firms in our sample as early adopters of the CII code, of which 7 are 
Group A firms.  In Table 7, regression (1), we add a dummy variable for these early 
adopters; this variable is negative (as expected) but insignificant. 
As of May 1999, 34 Indian firms (28 in Group A, 6 in Group B1) were already cross-
listed in foreign markets, mostly in Europe (29 in Europe, 5 in the U.S.).  These firms may 
respond differently than the other Indian firms to the Clause 49 announcement, because 
they may already be complying with higher disclosure standards to meet the cross-listing 
requirements.  We create a dummy variable for cross-listed firms and interact it with the 
groupA and groupB1 dummies (Table 7, regression (3)).  This interaction is positive and 
significant for Group A firms, and positive for Group B1 firms (significance is difficult to 
assess because of small sample size). 
 E. Cross-Sectional Dependence:  Event Study Results 
We address further in this section whether our results could reflect cross-sectional 
correlation among the returns to Group A firms.  We partly address cross-sectional 
correlation in earlier tables by using industry-group clusters and, in Table 6, controlling for 
the most obvious remaining sources of common returns across firms, notably size.26  We 
approach the possibility of cross-sectional correlation in a different way in Table 8, using 
event study methodology. 
                                                 
24  In unreported robustness checks, a dummy variable for ownership by a state is insignificant. 
25  In unreported regressions, we divide industries into those with high and low need for external 
capital based on Rajan & Zingales (1998).  The coefficient on the high-capital-need group is insignificant. 
26 In unreported regressions we tried different narrower and broader industry group, and Rajan & 
Zingales (1998) industry groups, with similar results.  
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Table 8 reports CARs for the firms in each group, relative to the B2EW index of 
small firms, computed in three ways.  The first approach assumes cross-sectional 
independence across firms; the z-statistics are very high, but unreliable in the presence of 
cross-sectional correlation.  In the second approach, we first combine all firms in an industry 
into a single portfolio, and computing returns to an equally weighted portfolio of the 
industry portfolios.  This allows for cross-sectional dependence within each industry but 
assumes independence across industries.  The abnormal return remains strong in this 
approach (coefficient = .055, z = 5.42).  In the third approach, we combine all firms in each 
group into a single portfolio.   This allows fully for cross-sectional dependence, at the cost of 
weaker power to reject the null when abnormal returns are present.  The abnormal return 
remains significant (coefficient = .054, z = 2.04). 
Brown and Warner (1985, p. 22) discuss the tradeoffs between these approaches.  
Their simulation results suggest that there can be "gains from procedures assuming 
independence . . . even when there is [some degree of] clustering, and all securities of a given 
sample have the same event date."  At the same time, they find significant misspecification if 
all sample firms come from the same industry.  This suggests that the second approach, in 
which we combine firms into industry portfolios, could well be a reasonable compromise. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
We report evidence on investor reaction to the May 1999 announcement of India's 
plans to adopt the Clause 49 governance reforms, considered a watershed event in the 
evolution of Indian corporate governance.  These reforms were patterned on a voluntary 
Corporate Governance Code issued the previous year by the Confederation of Indian 
Industry, and were supported by the CII.  At the time of initial announcement of the 
government's reform plans, investors had good reason to understand the likely content of 
the reforms (they would be similar to the CII Code), and reason to expect that key reforms 
would apply only, or perhaps earlier, to large firms (as CII had proposed). 
This confluence of events lets us assess investor reaction to the reform 
announcement, by measuring the share price returns to large firms, while using the returns to 
small firms to control for other new information that could affect overall share prices.  We 
find that large firms gain 4.5% on average, relative to small firms, over a 3-trading-day event 
window beginning on the announcement date.  This result is highly statistically significant 
and survives a variety of robustness checks. 
We conclude that investors expected the Clause 49 reforms to benefit large firms, 
and likely also medium-sized firms.  This suggests that properly designed mandatory 
corporate governance reforms can increase share prices in an emerging market such as India. 
A number of provisions of Clause 49 are similar to provisions of SOX.  Thus, the 
positive reaction of Indian investors to Clause 49 contrasts to the apparently negative 
investor reaction to SOX.  One explanation for the differing reactions is that the same 
reforms could have net benefits in a poor governance country, such as India prior to Clause 
49, yet net costs for already well-governed companies.  Just as governance is probably not 
one-size-fits-all at the company level, so too, governance rules are likely not one-size-fits-all 
at the country level. 
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Table 1.  Key Dates for Adoption of Clause 49 
Date Events Comment or Confounding Event 
April 1998 CII releases Code of Corporate Governance  
May 7, 1999 
Government announces support for 
governance reforms; SEBI announces 
formation of Kumarmangalam Birla 
Committee (KMBC) to propose these 
reforms. 
Key event date for this study 
June 11, 1999 
First newspaper discussion of KMBC 
deliberations and likely proposals. 
Unclear if significant. 
Confounded by breakdown in peace 
talks with Pakistan over Kashmir 
Sept. 30, 1999 Draft KMBC Report released. 
Unclear if significant for large firms. 
Confounded by Indian national 
elections. 
Oct. 14, 1999 
SEBI says it will promptly adopt KMBC 
recommendations. 
Unclear if significant. 
Confounded by Musharraf coup in 
Pakistan 
Jan. 26, 2000 
Final KMBC Report released; effective date 
announced 
No significant new information, no 
market reaction expected 
Feb. 21, 2000 Clause 49 goes into effect 
No significant new information, no 
market reaction expected 
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Table 2.  Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Panel A.  Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for 791 sample firms with returns during (0,+2) event window.  Group A, B1, and B2 designations 
are as determined by Bombay Stock Exchange.  Share returns are computed as sums of ln(daily return).  Foreign 
ownership excludes shares held by a foreign joint venture partner, if any.  Inside ownership is the number of shares held 
by insiders (as coded by PROWESS) divided by the total number of shares excluding shares held by a foreign joint 
venture partner, if any. 
Variable 
N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
No. of 
"1"s 
Min Max 
Definition 
return (0,+2) 791 0.045 0.075  -0.086 0.189 
Ln(share price return over (0,+2) window period).  
Min and max are with winsorizing at 5%/95% 
MAR (0,+2) 791 0.015 0.075  -0.116 0.159 
Ln(share price return-return to B2EW index (equal 
weighted index of group B2 firms)).  Min and max are 
with winsorizing at 5%/95%. 
CAR(0,+2) 482 0.038 0.094  -0.360 0.551 
Cumulative abnormal returns over (0,+2) window.  
5%/95% levels are -0.092 and +0.175. 
groupA 791   159   
Dummy variable (=1 for Group A Firms, 0 
otherwise). 
groupB1 791   378   
Dummy variable (=1 for Group B1 Firms, 0 
otherwise) 
groupB2 791   254   
Dummy variable (=1 for Group B2 Firms, 0 
otherwise) 
busgroup 791   402   
Dummy variable (=1 if firm belongs to a Business 
Group, 0 otherwise) 
govt-own 791     33     
Dummy variable (=1 if firm controlled by Indian 
Government, 0 otherwise) 
ln(assets) 771 5.444 1.712  0.0615 12.474 
ln(book value of total assets in crore rupees (107 
rupees)) 
growth 746 0.083 0.322  -1 1.053 
Geometric average sales growth from 1997-2001, 
winsorized at 1 and 99% 
foreign-own 770 0.029 0.068  0 0.621 
Foreign ownership as fraction of free-float (excludes 
shares held by insiders and JV partners) 
inside 770 0.372 0.243  0 0.993 Inside ownership as fraction of all shares 
 
Panel B.  Details on Trading frequency for sample firms 
Summary statistics for trading frequency for firms with returns during (0,+2) event window over the estimation period 
for our event study (May 6, 1998 - April 28, 1999 (238 trading days).  
   Sample firms: trading days during estimation period 
  
Firms in 
Group 
Firms in 
Sample 
mean 
std. 
dev. 
Min 5% median 95% Max 
Group A 198 159 225 35.6 51 137 238 238 238 
Group B1 724 378 186 54 34 69 205 238 238 
Group B2 2,589 254 141 57.3 31 52 143  238 
 
 
25
Black and Khanna:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2007
…..] Can Corporate Governance Reforms…Evidence from India, Draft 25 
 
Table 2, Panel C.  Industry Breakdown.  
Industry information for sample firms with returns during (0,+2) event window. 
Industry type Total Group A firms Group B1 firms Group B2 firms 
Agriculture & Manufacturing 279 59 185 35 
Chemical 110 28 71 11 
Finance 37 19 15 3 
Metals 37 12 21 4 
Computer 45 13 26 6 
Diversified 25 11 11 3 
Trade 16 2 8 6 
Transport 9 4 4 1 
Services 8 2 6 0 
Tourism 10 2 5 3 
Energy 10 4 5 1 
Telecom 4 2 1 1 
Construction 5 0 4 1 
Realty 0 0 0 0 
Consult 1 0 0 1 
Unknown 17 1 16 0 
Total firms 791 159 378 254 
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Table 2, Panel D.   
Pearson pairwise correlation coefficients.  * and boldface = significant at 5% level.  Sample size varies from 746 to 791. 
 return (0,+2) groupA groupB1 group_b2 ln(assets) busgroup growth inside foreign-own 
return (0,+2) 1         
groupA 0.18* 1        
groupB1 -0.002 -0.48* 1       
groupB2 -0.086 -0.16* -0.31* 1      
ln(assets) 0.15* 0.57* -0.02 -0.05 1     
busgroup 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.06 0.25* 1    
growth 0.11 0.16* 0.07 -0.25* 0.02 -0.10 1   
inside -0.04 -0.26* 0.15* 0.02 -0.16* 0.34* -0.01 1  
foreign-own 0.11 0.52* -0.20* -0.10 0.41* 0.11 0.18* -0.16* 1 
govt-own 0.02 0.34* -0.15* -0.05 0.36* -0.22* 0.02 -0.35* 0.10 
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Table 3.  Raw Returns over Different Window Periods 
Ordinary least squares regressions of raw returns over different event window periods against Group A and Group B1 
dummy variables.  The coefficient on the constant term captures the mean return to group B2 firms.  t-statistics, based 
on White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors with industry and group clusters, are shown in brackets. *, **, 
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in 
boldface. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
dep. variable Raw Returns over indicated window 
Window day 0 (0, +1) (0, +2) (0, +3) (0, +4) 
groupA 0.005 0.040*** 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.072*** 
 [0.54] [4.50] [5.84] [4.47] [5.34] 
groupB1 -0.003 0.022*** 0.020*** 0.022** 0.031*** 
 [-0.35] [2.88] [2.85] [2.39] [2.87] 
Constant 0.010 0.009 0.028*** 0.000 0.002 
 [1.21] [1.26] [5.83] [0.04] [0.18] 
Observations 952 837 791 765 747 
R2 0.001 0.020 0.025 0.026 0.045 
 
Table 4.  Raw Returns with Different Levels of Trimming or Winsorizing of Returns 
Ordinary least squares regressions of raw returns over (0, +2) window on Group A and Group B1 dummies, with 
different winsorizing and clustering choices.  t-statistics, based on White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors 
with industry and group clusters (clusters not available for robust regression), are shown in brackets. *, **, *** indicates 
significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively; significant results (at 5% level or better) in boldface. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Dep. Variable Raw returns (0,+2) 
 
all raw returns winsorized-2% & 
98% 
winsorized-5% & 
95% 
Trimmed-
2% & 98% 
Trimmed ± 
6%/day 
robust regression 
groupA 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 
 [5.84] [6.19] [6.47] [6.57] [7.61] [6.39] 
groupB1 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 
 [2.85] [3.04] [3.04] [3.17] [5.04] [3.16] 
Constant 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.017*** 0.021*** 
 [5.83] [7.04] [8.57] [9.75] [8.01] [4.34] 
Observations 791 791 791 761 745 791 
R2 0.044 0.038 0.044 0.045 0.064 0.049 
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Table 5: Comparing Raw Returns, MARs and CARs 
Ordinary least squares regressions of raw,. market-adjusted (MAR) and cumulative abnormal (CAR) returns over (0, +2)  
event period, winsorized at 5% and 95%, against groupA and groupB1 dummy variables.  MAR(BSE200) uses BSE200 
index as market index; MAR(B2EW) uses an equal-weighted index of B2 firms as market index, and similarly for CAR.  
t-statistics, based on White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors with industry and group clusters, are shown in 
brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively; significant results (at 5% level or better) 
in boldface (suppressed for constant term). 
 1 2 3 4 
dep. Variable Raw Returns MAR(BSE200) MAR(B2EW) CAR(B2EW) 
groupA 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 
 [6.47] [6.47] [6.47] [5.55] 
groupB1 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.024** 
 [3.29] [3.29] [3.29] [2.42] 
Constant 0.027 -0.033 -0.002 0.025 
 [8.57] [10.13] [0.65] [2.19] 
Observations 791 791 791 481 
R2 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.042 
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Table 6.  Market-Adjusted Returns with Different Control Variables 
Ordinary least squares regressions of market adjusted returns (MARs) over (0, +2) event window, winsorized at 5% and 
95%, against groupA and groupB1 dummy variables, with other control variables as shown.  MARs are computed 
relative to B2EW index (equal weighted index of Group B2 firms).  t-statistics, based on White's heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors with industry and group clusters, are shown in brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 
10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Significant results (at 5% level or better) in boldface.  
Labels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
dep. variable Market Adjusted Returns over (0, +2) 
groupA 0.045*** 0.035*** 0.040*** 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.048*** 0.048*** 
 [6.47] [3.39] [5.33] [6.54] [5.38] [5.58] [5.62] [5.88] [5.90] 
groupB1 0.017*** 0.011* 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 [3.29] [1.96] [2.85] [3.26] [2.99] [2.83] [3.01] [2.78] [2.50] 
ln(assets)  0.002        
  [0.81]        
growth   0.017**     0.021*** 0.016 
   [2.51]     [3.04] [1.65] 
busgroup    0.001      
    [0.11]      
inside     0.002     
     [0.16]     
foreign-own      0.020    
      [0.44]    
govt-own       -0.005   
       [0.40]   
groupA*growth        -0.048* -0.043 
        [1.85] [1.61] 
groupB1*growth         0.011 
         [0.90] 
constant -0.002 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 -[0.65] -[0.60] -[0.35] -[0.39] -[0.24] -[0.21] -[0.16] -[0.32] -[0.35] 
Observations 791 771 746 787 770 770 770 746 746 
R-squared 0.044 0.043 0.046 0.043 0.042 0.042 0.043 0.049 0.050 
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Table 7.  MARs with Early Adopter and Cross Listing Dummies  
Ordinary least squares regressions of market-adjusted returns (MARs) over (0, +2) event window, winsorized at 
5% and 95%, computed relative to B2EW index (equal weighted index of Group B2 firms), against groupA and 
groupB1 dummies, with other control variables as shown.  Regression (2) adds dummy variable for early 
adopters of the CII Code (=1 for 8 early adopters, 7 in Group A, 1 in group B1).  Regressions (3) adds cross-
listing dummy (=1 for 34 firms cross-listed in U.S. or Europe in May 1999, 28 in group A, 6 in group B1, 29 
are GDRs (London, Luxembourg, or Frankfurt), 5 are ADRs (U.S.)). Regression (4) interacts the cross-listing 
dummy with groupA and groupB1 dummies, to show predicted effects of cross-listing for firms in each group.  
t-statistics, based on White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors with industry and group clusters, are 
shown in brackets. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.  Significant results (at 
5% level or better) in boldface. 
 1 2 3 4 
dependent variable Market Adjusted Returns over (0, +2) 
groupA 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 
 [6.47] [7.07] [7.07] [5.37] 
groupB1 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 
 [3.29] [3.31] [3.15] [3.03] 
early adopter dummy  -0.014   
  [0.75]   
cross-list dummy   0.035**  
   [2.57]  
cross-list*groupA    0.029*** 
    [2.93] 
cross-list*groupB1    0.057 
    [1.31] 
Constant -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 -[0.65] -[0.65] -[0.65] -[0.65] 
Observations 791 791 791 791 
R2 0.044 0.044 0.052 0.053 
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Table 8.  Event Study Results 
Event study of cumulative abnormal returns over (0, +2) event window, relative to the B2EW Index for Group 
A, Group B1, and Group B2 firms.  "Firm" column assumes cross-sectional independence for firm returns 
during the event window.  "Industry" column groups firms into industry portfolios, with equal weight on each 
industry.  This allows for dependence within industry, but assumes independence across industries.  "Group" 
column combines all firms in a group into a single portfolio, and allows fully for within-group cross-sectional 
dependence.  Sample is limited to firms with 30 daily returns available during estimation period (a return on day 
t requires a trade on day t and day t-1).  Standard errors are estimated over May 6, 1998 - April 28, 1999 (ending 
6 trading days before event window).   *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. 
Significant results (at 5% level or better) are in boldface. 
 No. of firms Mean (z-stat) 
Portfolios  firm industry group 
Group A 155 0.058 0.055 0.054 
  (16.32)*** (5.42)*** (2.04)** 
Group B1 251 0.037 0.026 0.034 
  (9.34)*** (3.08)*** (1.66) 
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Appendix A:  Comparing Clause 49 and SOX 
Characteristic Clause 49 SOX and Surrounding Changes 
Director 
Independence 
• Requirement – 50% independent directors 
if Chairman is executive director or 33% if 
Chairman is a non-executive. 
• Definition – no material pecuniary 
relationship with company, not related to 
Board or one level below Board and no 
prior relationship with the Company for 
the last 3 years.   
• Nominee Directors of Financial 
Institutions - considered independent. 
• Requirement – majority independent 
directors (from NYSE and NASDAQ 
listing requirements). 
• Definition – no material relationships with 
company (NYSE listing requirement) and 
within last 3 years was not an employee of 
firm.27   
Board 
Requirements 
& Limitations 
• Meet 4 times a year (maximum 3 months 
between meetings).  
• Limits on number of committees a 
director can be on (10), but only 5 for 
which director can be Chair of committee. 
• Code of Conduct (Ethics) required. 
• SOX does not require a minimum number 
of meetings. 
• SOX does not limit number of 
directorships or committee assignments a 
person can hold. 
• SOX does not require a Code of Ethics, 
but does require disclosure of whether one 
exists and changes and waivers (NYSE 
requires Code of Ethics and disclosure). 
• SOX prohibits personal loans to directors 
(or executive officers). 
• NYSE & NASDAQ require: 
• Only independent directors on 
nominating and compensation 
committees. 
• Board review if an audit committee 
member serves on more than three 
public board audit committees. 
(NYSE only). 
• Adoption of corporate governance 
guidelines (NYSE only). 
Audit 
Committee 
Composition 
• At least 3 directors (two-thirds must be 
independent).  
• All financially literate.  
• At least one having accounting or financial 
management experience. 
• Each member must be independent. 
• Must disclose if at least one member is a 
‘financial expert’. 
• If there is no explicit audit committee then 
entire board acts as audit committee.  
Audit 
Committee 
Role & Powers 
• minimum 4 meetings/year (gap between 
meetings not exceed 4 months). 
• broad role – review statutory and internal 
auditors as well as internal audit function, 
obtain outside legal or other professional 
• SOX does not require a minimum number 
of meetings. 
• broad role – oversee work of public 
accounting firm and internal quality 
control, authority to retain independent 
                                                 
27 SOX requires that independence members of the audit committee receive no consulting fees from 
or, have another relationship with, affiliated companies. 
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advise, and review whistleblower program 
if one exists amongst other things. 
advisors, establish procedures for 
complaints and anonymous reporting 
amongst other things. 
Disclosures 
• Related party transactions,  
• Accounting treatments and departures,  
• Risk management,  
• Annual report include discussion of 
internal controls adequacy, significant 
trends, risks, and opportunities, 
• Proceeds from offerings,  
• Compensation for directors  (including 
non-executives and obtain shareholders’ 
approval),  
• Details of compliance history for last 3 
years. 
• Corporate governance reports (and 
disclose adoption, if any, of mandatory 
and non-mandatory requirements). 
• Related party transactions,28   
• Accounting treatments and departures,29  
• Real-time disclosure of any material 
changes in financial condition.  
• Annual report must include internal control 
evaluation, and evaluate any change likely 
to materially affect internal controls over 
financial reporting.  
• Compensation of directors and executives. 
• NYSE requires adoptions and disclosure of 
corporate governance guidelines. 
• Disclosure to audit committee of any 
deficiencies of, or changes to, internal 
controls; and fraud, regardless of 
materiality.  
Certifications 
• CEO & CFO:  
 financial statements 
 effectiveness of internal controls 
 legal transactions 
 inform audit committee of any 
significant changes in the above. 
• Auditor or Company Secretary: 
 Compliance with corporate 
governance. 
• CEO & CFO  
• financial statements 
• effectiveness of internal controls 
• Auditor or Company Secretary:  
• All critical accounting practices used 
and alternative treatments that have 
been discussed with management. 
Other  
Recommendations: 
• Whistleblower policy is optional 
• Independent directors loses status as 
“independent” if served 9 years at 
company 
• Training board members 
• Evaluate non-executive board 
performance. 
Requirements: 
• Stronger protection for whistleblowers. 
• Attorneys are required to report violations 
to chief legal counsel or CEO or to the 
board of directors. 
 
                                                 
28 The entire board must review all related party transactions (NASDAQ-listed companies only). 
29 This includes material adjustments to GAAP and Off-balance sheet transactions.   
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APPENDIX B:  CLAUSE 49 IMPLEMENTATION SCHEDULE 
Effective Date Company Category Comment 
March 31, 2001 Companies in Group A of the BSE.30  
March 31, 2002 Companies, not in BSE Group A, with paid 
up share capital of at least 100 million Rs, or 
net worth of at least 250,000,000 Rs. at any 
time in the company's history. 
Of the firms in our sample 
expected to comply by 
March 31, 2002, 71% are B1 
firms and the remainder are 
B2 firms. 
March 31, 2003 
(later extended to 
April 1, 2005) 
Other companies with paid up share capital 
of at least 30,000,000 Rs. 
Of the firms in our sample 
expected to comply by 
March 31, 2003, 76 % are 
B2 firms and the remainder 
are B1 firms. 
Time of listing Companies seeking listing for the first time.  
 
                                                 
30 Companies in the S&P CNX Nifty Index on the National Stock Exchange were also required to 
comply by March 31, 2001.  All companies in this index are also Group A firms on the Bombay Stock 
Exchange. 
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